@Maka, the route downsizing has not been done, it is rather evident. This is the elephant in the room and it is the bitter pill to be swallowed before the patient can be moved to HDU and hopefully the General Ward. I am yet to run the exact numbers but this is the general theme. Let us retrace where the roof started cracking. Back in 2004 - 2006 KQ was running a very profitable and near optimally resourced airline. Load factors were among the best in global aviation space. What did Tito and team do? They went on a route opening spree opening up new routes in remote places in Africa whose result was to go into cities whose aviation routes were not developed and would require long lead times. Nothing wrong with that but it is the pace of doing it. One can't have 30% of new routes that have long lead times opened up in 2 years. If you are expanding into big cities where the economies are large enough, passenger volumes and airport infra support viable business cases then you only have to deal with competition to make money. What happens when you go to economies emerging from decades of war, ravaged by political instability, limited commerce and challenged airport infra? you end up having to wait for eons to make money or worse you never make money over the next 10-20 years because the routes don't make commercial sense and perhaps that is the reason why nobody flies there. I believe this is what KQ needs to trail its eyes on.

KQ has many of these routes to West Africa, what has happened is that the cash holes have drained the good routes and challenged the resources and quality of product on the profitable routes (OTP, price flexibility and Equipment quality) to the extent the profitable routes were since invaded by competition while KQ was opening up Africa its share severely dented. Classic examples are; Nairobi - Lagos, Nairobi - Lusaka, Nairobi - Dubai, Nairobi - Accra, Nairobi - London, Nairobi - Bangkok etc.

The Western Africa routes I believe had very weak business cases supporting them and closing down non profitable ones is the initial step in getting KQ back on recovery. The routes have ended up messing KQ's aircraft architecture, where KQ would use large B777s and optimize on scale while making shitloads of cash, they now ended up having to rely on Embraers which are limited in cargo haulage and economies of scale. Plus if you are landing in Lagos daily with an Embraer or an enroute 737-800 when you used to land daily with a 777, iko shida.

Until KQ retraces it's business model fixing the business as is, will be very expensive and inefficient.

In 2012 I predicted KQ would be a government baill off case by 2015, my fear is if they don't shrink, the airline my to be broken up into what GoK requires to have as a minimum for strategic reasons which they can support and what must the other airline but that must be let to die. Tz and Uganda already let their national carriers die natural deaths it's not unthinkable.

It is all not about shrinking the routes but a clear strategy / sound management is lacking. West Africa is a gem. There are underlying issues which needs to be addressed. One of them is KQ's product which has deteriorated since 2012 when well trained staff were sacked. The relationship with KLM among other issues. Ngunze cannot deliver and should just vacate.

It is very likely that there is a problem with the management of KQ. With time, this shall come to pass.

I have always complained about the management...they run the co kienyeji all the well trained guys who have worked for years at the airline are leaving.

No wonder they keep making very costly mistakes like fuel hedging at a higher price when the whole world including random people on the streets can see the prices heading south!!!

Which other major airlines made such self defeating hedges in the same period?

We started discussing KQ's disastrous hedging strategy in Wazua ages ago!

After decades of spending billions of dollars to hedge against rising fuel costs, more airlines, including some of the world’s largest, are backing off after getting burned by low oil prices.

When oil prices were rising, hedging often paid off for the airlines, helping them reduce their exposure to higher fuel costs. But the speed of the 58% plunge in oil prices since mid-2014 caught the industry by surprise and turned some hedges into big money losers.

Last year, Delta Air Lines Inc., the nation’s No. 2 airline by traffic, racked up hedging losses of $2.3 billion, while United Continental Holdings Inc., the No. 3 carrier, lost $960 million on its bets.

Meanwhile, No. 1-ranked American Airlines Group Inc., which abandoned hedging in 2014, enjoyed cheaper fuel costs than many of its rivals as a result. “Hedging is a rigged game that enriches Wall Street,” said Scott Kirby, the airline’s president, said in an interview.

Now, much of the rest of the industry is rethinking the costly strategy of using complex derivatives to lock in fuel costs, airlines’ second-largest expense after labor.

But why does your mother trust me with extreme sensitive areas. I am a noble man

KQ shall rise from the ashes like the proverbial phoenix. Airline investment is not for everyone and requires patience

Why is Ngunze still the CEO?